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Microeconomic effects of the trade regime
One can make a number of qualitative predictions from economic theory
about the effects of a trade regime such as that of Turkey. (1) There are
bound to be differences among industries in the social return to factors of
production employed in them. (2) The criteria for obtaining import licenses
and permission to import capital goods will lead to differences in efficiency
among firms. (3) The method of allocating import licenses is likely to lead to
underutilization of capacity and general excess costs of production. (4) Sub-
sidizing capital goods imports will induce substitution of capital for labor, at
least for firms receiving permission to import capital goods. This will have
implications for employment and income distribution.
In this chapter an attempt is made to ascertain the quantitative impor-
tance of each of these effects in Turkey during the latter half of the 19 60's.
That period represents a time when the trade regime was fairly stable (a!-
though the premium on import licenses was increasing over time) and when
Turkey was in Phase II. It is also a period for which data are available to a
more satisfactory extent than is true for the earlier experience with Phase II
in the 1950's.
In Section I, estimates of Domestic Resource Costs (DRCs) for various
activities are presented to provide evidence as to the variation in economic
costs arising between industries and firms. In Section lIthe excess costs of
production associated with the system are evaluated. In Section III the effects
of the trade regime upon employment, factor proportions and income distri-
bution are examined.
This chapter is concerned with the effects of the trade regime and its
interaction with domestic policies upon individual fIrms and industries. In
Chapter IX estimates will be provided of the macroeconomic effects of the
trade regime upon economic growth.
I. Domestic resource costs
From 1953 until the time of writing, there have consistently been differen.
tial incentives to producers within Turkey. The result has been biased incen-
tives, not only away from export activities but also among import-competing
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activities. During the 1950's most of the differentials in incentives were the
outcome of the measures taken by the government in response to the excess
demand for imports that resulted from maintenance of a fixed exchange rate
in the presence of inflationary pressures. After 1962 the import regime was
much more consciously geared to fostering irn port-substitution. Although the
average differential between export and import EERs remained approximate-
ly constant over the entire period, variations in nominal and effective rates of
protection among different activities increased considerably in the 1960's.
Increased use of such instruments as the "Prohibited List" meant that the
protection afforded by duties and surcharges, as in the 1950's, became rela-
tively less important than other protective devices. By the late 1960's the
premia on import licenses varied enormously between commodity categories.
Differences in costs between industries and firms
One would expect significant disparities in the economic costs of various
activities to result from such highly protective measures. Two sorts of dispari-
ties can be distinguished: (1) production would have higher opportunity costs
in some industries than in others; and (2) firms within the same industry
might produce at varying levels of efficiency.
Differences in opportunity costs between industries can result, with pro-
tection, because of the differential degree of total protection afforded to
different industries. With differential protective levels, all the factors that
determine a country's comparative cost structure, the capital and skill-inten-
sity of the industry, the industry's location relative to the source of its inputs
and their transport costs, technology, scale, and so on, affect the economic
costs of the industry.
Differences in efficiency between firms in the same industry will not result
from protection if the means used to grant protection enable competition
among firms and expansion of highly profitable firms. In Turkey, however,
the nature of quantitative restrictions and other controls both prevented
competition and restricted the ability of firms to expand when they wished:
(1) the availability of imported inputs limited output for those firms requir-
ing imported inputs on the quota lists —whichincluded assemblers' quotas
and manufacturers' quotas (see below); (2) most new investments (as seen in
Chapter VI) required imported capital goods which were subject to quota
allocation and required the SPO's permission.'
1. Not only was SPO approval generally required, by the late 1960's, but the value of
the investment incentives —postponementor reduction of duties upon imported
capital goods —wasso high that few firms would carry out their investment plans
without receiving the SPO's dispensation from the duties.
I
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Assemblers' and manufacturers' quotas were used to allocate imports of
intermediate goods in most of the new import-substituting industries. These
quotas, allocated on a firm-specific basis, were not item-specific but user-
specific. By 1970 there were thirteen assemblers' quotas (covering tractors,
vehicles, radios, typewriters and other import-substituting assembly produc-
tion) amounting to $11.9 million, and forty-one manufacturers' quotas (cov-
ering production of such items as tires, transformers, washing machines, in-
dustrial furnaces, paints, light bulbs, electric motors, and so on) whose value
was $10.4 million. All import licenses under these quotas required Ministry of
Industry certificates for firm-specific allocations.2
Thus for firms requiring imported inputs subject to quota allocations there
was little opportunity for competition, since output was virtually determined
by the size of the quota allocation. Similarly, expansion of low-cost firms
could not be undertaken automatically and was generally disapproved if ex-
cess capacity existed in the industry or if it was anticipated that demand
would not expand by enough to warrant additional capacity. Even when
expansion of an industry was deemed warranted, attempts were made to be
"fair" and to allocate investment-goods import licenses pro -rata with applica-
tions for expansion. Since intermediate goods import licenses were allocated
in proportion to firms' capacities,3 there were incentives for all firms in the
industry to apply for investment goods import licenses, for the penalty for
not doing so was likely to be a reduced share of the quota allocation.
Measuring economic costs
Under optimal resource allocation, all industries and firms in a country
will produce to the point where the domestic marginal rate of transformation
(DMRT) between any two commodities equals the international marginal rate
of transformation (IMRT). In the absence of monopoly power in internation-
al trade, and ignoring intermediate goods for the moment, the IMRT equals
the ratio of international prices between pairs of commodities. In the absence
of distortions in the domestic market, the ratio of domestic prices would
equal the DMRT.
The domestic price ratio cannot be used in the presence of distortions, and
an alternative measure, domestic resource cost (DRC), provides a better indi-
cator. It is designed to provide an empirical estimate of the DMRT by adjust-
ing domestic prices to reflect the opportunity costs of producing various
commodities. Thus elements of monopoly rent must be removed from domes-
tic prices when there are domestic monopolies. When there are distortions in
2. Official Gazette, No. 13391, January 5, 1970.
3. See Section 1!, below.
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factor markets, adjustments must be made so that the social opportunity
costs (shadow prices) of factors of production employed in each activity are
reflected.
To allow for the presence of intermediate goods, the DRC measure (as
with domestic and international price ratios under perfect markets) becomes
a value-added measure. Thus the DRC of a given activity reflects the DMRT
of producing value-added.
In empirical measurement, DRCs are computed per dollar of international
value-added, and the IMRT between pairs of activities is thus one. Inequalities
in DRCs therefore reflect the facts that DMRTs and IMRTs are unequal and
that there is a consequent non-optimal resource allocation. The wider the
difference between DRCs, the greater the disparity between IMRTs and
DMRTs. Thus if one activity has a DRC twice as high as another, the implica-
tion is that had the first activity not been undertaken and had the resources
been employed in the second activity, these resources would have produced
twice as much foreign exchange earning or saving as under the existing alloca-
tion.4
A crucial assumption is that industries or activities could expand or con-
tract at relatively constant costs. While such an assumption is sometimes
unwarranted, it is valid for data from plants in developing countries where the
investments could be duplicated and where the unit of observation is an
integral investment project.
Of course there are numerous empirical difficulties that lead to imperfec.
tion in the measurement of DRCs. Even in a country with perfectly competi-
tive markets and no impediments to international trade, one would not
expect exact equality of all DRCs at a point in time, for dynamic adjustments
could be taking place and errors in measurement could be made. But in such a
country one would not be able to observe persistent wide differences in
DRCs, since competition would provide a mechanism where low-cost firms
could expand and high-cost firms would contract.
Sources of DRC data for Turkey
Estimates of Turkish DRCs in the late 1960's are available from several
sources. The data are presented in Table VIII-l, but before analyzing them,
differences between the methods of computations used in the different
4. For a fuller exposition of the DRC measure and its see Anne 0. Krueger,
"Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes: Theory and Measurement," Journal of
Political Economy, January/February 1972; and Michael Bruno, "Domestic Re-
source Costs and Effective Protection: Clarification and Synthesis," Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, January/February 1972.
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Table VlIl-1
Summary of estimates of DRCs and sectoral DRCs (TL per dollar)
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Canvas top for vehicles
Nylon textiles
















Forest products 10.44 n.a.
Sector average 1968 10.44
Leather products 10.24 n.a.
Driver seat for vehicle1966 10.24
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Table VlII-1 (continued)
Resource Allocational and Growt4
Iron and steel
Iron and steel products







Rubber products 45.59 890.49
Sector average 1968 15.93
Hoses for vehicles 1966 78.49
Weatherstripping
for vehicles 1966 23.68
Tires 1 1966 13.45
Tires 2 1966 26.98
Truck tires 1965 81.40
Passenger tires 1965 79.20
Plastic 37.05843.90
Plastic 1965 66.10
Plastic bags 1969 8.00
Chemicals 14.56 16.92
Sector average 1968 14.40
Rayon 1968 16.11






Citric acid 1969 11.00 .
Paints 1966 22.96
Vehicle battery 1966 16.13
Cement 14.80 6.26
Sector average 1968 13.68
Factory 1 1966 15.71
Factory 2 1966 16.75
Factory 3 1966 16.36
Cementplant 1969 11.50
Stone and clay products 10.62 na.
Tiles 1968 10.62
Glass and ceramics 10.80 28.34 •
Sector average 1968 11.52
Glass windshield 1966 8.30
Car outside mirror 1966 21.76
Rear view mirror 1966 4.91
Glassware 1965 7.90
Windowglass 1965 10.40
























































































































Brake and clutch lining
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Table VIII-! (continued)




















Note:A negative DRC means that the foreign-exchange cost of the inputs (direct
and indirect) exceeds the foreign-exchange value of the output.
Sources:Data for 1965 are from Anne 0. Krueger, "Some Economic Costs of Exchange
Control: The Turkish Case," Journal of Political Economy, October 1966.
Data indicated as 1966 are from data compiled by the USAID Mission, Ankara,
in the summer of 1966. Data for 1968 are from: Necati t$zfirat, "Competitive
Ability in the Manufacturing Industries and the Structure of Cost," Pub. No.
SPO 754, Economic Planning 267, SPO. Data for 1969 are from Anne 0.
Krueger, Turkish Domestic-Foreign Price Relationships, 1969, mimeograph
(Ankara), 1969.
sources should be mentioned. The 1965 and 1969 data are similar in that all
estimates are based on the assumption that firms operate at full capacity, and
that all capital —equityplus debt —earneda shadow return of 20 per cent.
The 1969 data, however, differ from the 1965 data in two regards: (1) They
were all drawn from loan applications which had been approved and where
one criterion for extending a loan was that the DRC not be too high. Thus
there is something of a downward bias in the 1969 estimates. By contrast, the
1965 data consisted both of loan applications at a time when no such crite-
rion was used and of existing firm experience (projected to full capacity
utilization) and loan project information. (2) The 1969 data did not contain a
breakdown of the firms' domestically purchased inputs into tradeable and
home goods whereas the 1965 data did. For 1969, therefore, DRCs were
computed on three alternative assumptions: a) all purchased inputs were
tradeable at TL 9$l; b) all domestically purchased inputs were home goods;
and c) all purchased inputs were tradeable at TL 1 5$ 1. Assumption (c) is per-
haps the most realistic, and the one used in the data for Table VIIl-l. But it
should be noted that the rank correlations between DRCs computed on the
three alternative bases all exceeded 0.95. The only significant difference was
that some 1969 observations indicated foreign exchange losses (negative for-
eign exchange saving) when computed on the basis of assumption (a).
Data for 1966 were obtained by USAID personnel in the summer of 1966
and are based upon interviews and questionnaires with over 150 Turkish
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firms.These data were derived entirely from existing firms' actual operations.
No adjustments were made for differing rates of return upon capital, varying
degrees of capacity utilization, and the like. Thus the data really represent the
IL value added at market prices divided by the foreign exchange saved or
earned when direct and indirect utilization of foreign exchange in inputs is
taken into account.
The 1968 data are also based upon actual operating experience. Their chief
drawbacks are that no adjustment was made for varying profit rates and that
indirect imports utilized in production were not subtracted from internation-
al value-added estimates. The net effect is probably to bias the 1968 estimates
downward. For example, the refrigerator estimate for 1968 (under Machinery
and Parts) is TL 15 per dollar and that for 1969 is TL 27.7 per dollar.
Although inflation may have affected the estimates slightly, the 1968 esti-
mate allowed a zero return on capital, and the 1969 estimate allowed a 20 per
cent rate of return. Moreover, indirect imports used in production were
netted out of international value added in the 1969 estimates and not in the
1968 ones. While there is no way of knowing whether the same refrigerator
producer was evaluated in the 1968 and 1969 data, adjusting the 1969 data
to a zero profit base and adding indirect imports into foreign exchange saved
accounts for over 95 per cent of the difference between the two estimates of
DRCs. It was not possible to contrast the sources of differences to the same
extent in all other cases, but the relationships between the various sources of
data generally appear consistent over the range of commodities observed.
Variations in DRCs
In Table V11I-l the date after each activity denotes the source of the
estimate, as indicated in the notes to the table. There is wide variation in
DRCs among industries and activities. Despite the fact that the four sources
did not provide estimates on an entirely comparable basis, all four sets of
estimates show this wide variation.
The last two columns of Table VIII-1 provide an unweighted mean of all
the estimates for each sector and the variance of DRCs around the sectoral
means. The sectoral means and variances should be interpreted with extreme
care, since negative DRCs (where the international value of the inputs ex-
ceeded the international value of the output) could not be included in the
estimates. The chemicals sector, for exnmple, has a relatively low mean DRC.
Yet out of nine estimates for that sector, two activities showed negative
international value-added. Because these two observations were not included
in the computation of the mean and variance for chemicals, both numbers
appear low. Similarly, the presence of an extreme observation, given the small
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influences the mean and variance. Thus iron and steel products contain nuts
and bolts, which were computed to have a DRC of 791.80. The mean for the
sector therefore is above all but that observation, although an iron products
factory had a negative DRC in 1966 and was therefore excluded from the
sectoral mean.
We now consider the evidence. DRCs for the food and beverage sector
have been relatively low (with a few notable exceptions). If one assumes that
TL 15 =$1was close to an equilibrium exchange rate during the latter half of
the 1960's, all subsectors except sugar, alcoholic beverages (which were a
State Monopoly and whose DRC is therefore difficult to interpret since the
1968 estimates are not adjusted for different levels of profitability), tea and
canned food were clearly export industries. The DRC for meat products
should be especially noted. It is a sector in which Turkey probably has a vast
unrealized export potential. There has been a sizeable, mostly illegal, export
of meat products over Turkey's eastern border, and the Turkish internal price
of meat is below the international price. Government policies aimed at keep-
ing the domestic price of meat down have been a major factor in discouraging
the development of meat exports.
In food products, as in other the variation in DRCs appears to be
of about the same order of magnitude as the differences in incentives between
export and import-competing producers. Thus figs, raisins, hazelnuts and
tomato canning all had DRCs below ten while sugar (an import-substitution
industry) had a DRC in excess of 30. The only DRC estimate in the food and
beverage sector that appears inconsistent with the export-import-substitution
generalization is that for canned food 1968. That estimate is well above those
for tomato paste and tomato canning, which are the two predominant forms
of food canning. Most observers believe that food canning is an industry in
which Turkey has relatively low economic costs, and where exports could be
developed profitably under an alternative trade regime. The cause of the high
figure in this sample is not known, but it is possible that the 1968 estimate
did not adjust for disparities between the domestic and international price of
tinpiate. For canning, the fact that domestically-produced tinplate was priced
at about three times the world level effectively precluded the development of
canned-food exports. it is also possible, of course, that a high-cost firm was
the basis for the estimate of the canned food DRC.
Like the food sector, the textile sector appears generally to have relatively
low DRCs, but there are several exceptions. The 1966 study indicated a
negative foreign-exchange saving for nylon textiles, and both serge and MA 88
cloth had DRCs above TL 20 per dollar in 1968. The coexistence of low-cost
and high-cost firms in the same sector is consistent with a priori expectations
about the effects of the trade regime.
Other sectors, where there are very few observations but for which DRCs
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appear to be reasonably low, are forest products, leather products, and stone
and clay products. As seen in Chapter VII there is some independent evidence
suggesting that these sectors may have considerable export potential, which
tends to corroborate the low DRC estimates.
The picture is rather different on the import-substitution side. The iron
and steel sector was generally high cost. In the 1968 study iron and steel was
found to be the highest-cost sector. While some of the high costs may have
been attributable to start-up activities of the industry, some of the firms in
the sample had been operating for extended periods. Iron and steel products
show the widest variation in DRCs. Many of the items included in that sector
are parts and components for vehicles, but other items exhibit equally high
variation. The bolts and nuts DRC is reflected in the sectoral average and
variance. Even omitting bolts and nuts, however, the average DRC for iron
and steel products is TL 24.3.
Machinery and parts, transport equipment, paper, plastic, rubber and
chemicals are other sectors where many of the activities are import-substitu-
tion oriented. As can be seen, some DRCs have been negative, implying that
there have been negative foreign exchange savings in import-substitution.
That is especially true for fertilizer, where the transport cost of importing raw
materials exceeds the transport cost of importing the finished product.
The wide variation in DRCs on the import.substitution side is indicative of
the degree to which encouragement of import-substitution has been indis-
criminate. Some activities clearly were economically sound investments,
whereas others were extremely high cost. That happened not only between
different production lines, but also in the same production line. Tires, within
the rubber products sector, are a case in point. The two 1966 DRC estimates,
made on a comparable basis, indicate a DRC of 13.5 for one firm and 27 for
another. There can be little doubt that the production of tires at a DRC of
13.5 would have been economically justified and profitable under optimal
resource allocation whereas production at a DRC of 27 would not have been.
Yet under the trade regime and investment regulations both firms were able
to survive.
Another factor should also be noted. Among the import-substitution ac-
tivities, some would have been viable exports under appropriate incentives.
Yet the high cost of inputs from other domestic industries (where importing
the input was infeasible because of the "Prohibited List") effectively pre-
cluded the possibility of developing export markets. The cases of tinpiate and
canned food have already been cited, and there were many similar instances.
Thus in some cases import.substitution was not only high-cost in itself, but it
also had indirect costs, given the use of the "Prohibited List," in preventing the
development of exports in other industries.
It is evident that under an alternative and economically more desirable set
225 ,nomic Effects of the Trade Regime
nd steel products contain nuts
C of 791.80. The mean for the
on, although an iron products
s therefore excluded from the
the food and beverage sector
ceptions). If one assumes that
rate during the latter half of
tolic beverages (which were a
lifficult to interpret since the
evels of profitability), tea and
DRC for meat products
ch Turkey probably has a vast
mostly ifiegal, export
the Turkish internal price
policies aimed at keep-
major factor in discouraging
nation in DRCs appears to be
èrences in incentives between
fIgs, raisins, hazelnuts and
;ugar (an import-substitution
)RC estimate in the food and
te export-import-substitution
estimate is well above those
the two predominant forms
od canning is an industry in
and where exports could be
egime. The cause of the high
ible that the 1968 estimate
ic and international price of
roduced tinplate was priced
ecluded the development of
that a high-cost firmwas
generally to have relatively
he 1966 study indicateda
and both serge and MA 88
The coexistence of low-cost
it with a priori expectations
but for which DRCs226 MicroeconomicEffects of the Trade Regime Resource Allocational and Growth 4
of incentives Turkey could have achieved a considerable increase in net for-
eign exchange availability for the same level of investments and resources
devoted to the manufacturing sector. The unweighted average of sectoral
DRCs from the data in Table VIII-l was TL 23.5 per dollar. A more selective
import-substitution policy and increased incentives for efficiency resulting
from competition could certainly have reduced the average substantially. Esti-
mates of the increased output which could have been achieved will be pres-
ented in Chapter IX.Theyare based upon data from sectoral averages. When
interpreting those results it will be important to bear in mind that the sectoral
data themselves conceal a great deal of variation among subsectors and among
firms.
II. Excess real costs of the system
In addition to expecting a restrictionist trade regime to result in wide
variations in costs of different activities, one would also anticipate that a
system such as the Turkish would impose excess real costs on virtually all
firms operating under the regime. Several types of excess costs are identifi-
able: (1) entrepreneurial time and energy; (2) additional clerical staff required
to handle paperwork; (3) expenses, such as airplane trips to the capital,
associated with obtaining import licenses; (4) costs associated with the effects
of the regime on inventory levels; and (5) excess capacity resulting either
from inability to obtain imports or from incentives to overbuild resulting
from the trade regime.
The first three costs are extremely difficult to quantify, and their impor-
tance is hard to estimate. Entrepreneurship is generally regarded as a scarce
resource in developing countries. If entrepreneurial energies and efforts are
devoted to obtaining import licenses, the drain on the scarce resource clearly
constitutes a cost of the import regime. Likewise, insofar as firms must hire
additional bookkeepers, clerks and office staff to handle the paperwork asso-
ciated with obtaining licenses, the firm's costs are increased by the import
regime.
There is no evidence available with which to evaluate the magnitude of the
costs incurred in obtaining import licenses. Even interviews failed to yield any
firm estimates. Some businessmen stated that they would be willing to pay
about 10 per cent above landed cost if items could be domestically produced,
since they could save that much by avoiding the licensing process. However,
there is clearly an important difference in the magnitude of cost-saving, when
the source of supply of one item shifts from the foreign to the domestic
market and when all items shift or when licensing procedures are simplified
for all items.
The last two components
capacity, can be evaluated to
nents are considered. It shoub
incurred in obtaining licenses
tance.
Excess inventory costs
Incentives to hold large sto
factors: (1) for Liberalized I
length of delay in issuing lic
continue on the Liberalized L
the date at which licensing
(2) for Quota List items a) th
could be placed during each si
sufficient to cover until the
possibility that imports mighi
lower-quality domestic capacil
and Quota List importr, the d
half of the 1960's, so that
likely to be profitable; and (
discussionof possible devalual
were increasing, so that expec
tories of imported foods were
goods therefore made invent
guarantee deposit requirement
The import regime, of cou:
stocks of imported goods. Th
to excess production costs du
other cases where firms incur
they would have under a liben
Thus it was not simply I
goods,but the composition o
times very high costs were inc
several cases reported in intex
copper tubing wereair-freigi
been obtained to do so a mo:
tion. Resort to the black
not only the costs ofprodu
items and non.standardized in
There is no means of quar
tories of imported inputs weieconomic Effects of the Trade Regime Resource Allocational and Growth Effects of the Regime in the 1960's 227
Thelast two components of excess costs, inventory and underutilized
capacity, can be evaluated to some extent. In this section, these two compo-
nents are considered. It should be borne in mind, however, that the costs
incurred in obtaining licenses are unknown, but certainly are of some impor-
tance.
Excess inventory costs
Incentives to hold large stocks of imported goods originated from several
factors: (1) for Liberalized List goods there was uncertainty as to a) the
length of delay in issuing licenses in the future, b) whether goods would
continue on the Liberalized List or be eligible for importation at all, and c)
the date at which licensing would be suspended for the current import period;
(2) for Quota List items a) there was the consideration that only one order
could be placed during each six-month period —sothat inventories had to be
sufficient to cover until the next importing period, and b) there was the
possibility that imports might be prohibited at a future date as higher-cost,
lower-quality domestic capacity came onstream; (3) for both Liberalized List
and Quota List imports, the domestic premium was rising rapidly in the latter
half of the 1960's, so that investment in inventory for resale or own use was
likely to be profitable; and (4) throughout much of the 1960's there was
discussion of possible devaluation. Stamp taxes and other charges for imports
were increasing, so that expectations of profitability of investment in inven-
tories of imported foods were further enhanced. Excess demand for imported
goods therefore made inventory accumulation profitable despite the high
guarantee deposit requirements.
The import regime, of course, prevented firms from attaining their desired
stocks of imported goods. There were cases where low inventory holdings led
to excess production costs due to plant shutdowns or production delays, and
other cases where firms incurred the costs of holding higher inventories than
• they would have under a liberalized import regime.
Thus it was not simply the aggregate level of inventories of imported
goods, but the composition of the inventories that led to excess costs. Some-
times very high costs were incurred as a penalty for inadequate inventories. In
several cases reported in interviews, bulky materials such as carbon black and
copper tubing were air-freighted into Turkey after special permission had
• been obtained to do so a month or more after the plant had ceased produc-
tion. Resort to the black market was probably fairly frequent and entailed
not only the costs of production delays but also those of inferior-quality
items and non-standardized inputs.
There is no means of quantifying the costs incurred by firms whose inven-
tories of imported inputs were suboptimal. However, there is some evidence
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to suggest that despite the import regime firms were generally successful in
avoiding those costs by holding considerably larger inventories than they
would have considered optimal had imports been liberalized. Interviews, a
sample of firms' balance sheets, and data on the ratio of investment in inven-
tory to total investments in Turkey compared to other countries all suggest
the same result. Interviews with industrialists provided some impressionistic
evidence. Businessmen in firms with foreign parent companies were especially
vocal on the subject of inventory costs, It was generally claimed that a West
European producer would hold inventories adequate for about two months'
production, at an average interest cost of 8 per cent. The Turkish counter-
part, by contrast, would hold inventories adequate for an average six months'
production, at an interest cost of 14 per cent. For domestic producers, the
Turkish rate of inflation probably equated the real interest rate with that in
Europe. Even so, the real costs associated with an average inventory level
three times as high as that incurred under a liberal trade regime certainly
constituted, at least in part, an excess real cost of the system. Firms which
might otherwise have exported were, of course, at an even greater disadvan-
tage as long as the exchange rate, and foreign prices, remained stable, as the
14 per cent interest charge then constituted a true cost disadvantage.
A sample of thirty-two Turkish firms' balance sheets, as of the close of
each firm's 1969 fiscal year, provides some additional information.5 From
each firm's balance sheet, the value of raw materials and other goods used in
production —butnot its holding of semi-finished and finished products —
wascalculated. In addition, each firm's net fixed assets were taken. The
weighted average ratio of inventories of inputs to net fixed assets was 0.465 5,
and the unweighted average was 0.5175, thus implying that for the sample
firms' inventory investment was approximately half as large as investment in
fixed assets.
Data on the corn position of gross domestic capital formation in various
countries tend to confirm impressions from the sample and from interviews.
Table VIII-2 provides estimates of the ratio of investment in inventory to
fixed capital investment for a sample of countries. The average ratio for the
three years 1966 to 1968 was used, since inventory investment can show
sizeable year-to-year fluctuations. As can be seen, Turkish investment in
stocks in the three years averaged 15 per cent of investment in fixed capital.
That ratio is more than twice that of all countries in the sample except that
of Japan and Spain.
Although the high Turkish ratio of inventory to fixed investment cannot
be attributed entirely to the trade regime (domestically produced goods were
5. The data were kindly provided by the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey. All
firms in the sample had applied for loans from the bank, and most had received
them.
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Table VHI-2
Ratio of investment in stocks to fixed investment, various countries, 1966 to 1968
Country Ratio Country Ratio
Australia 0.080 Israel 0.030
Belgium 0.036 Italy 0.038
Brazil 0.074 Japan 0.135
Chile 0.081 Korea 0.060
Denmark 0.049 Netherlands 0.054
France 0.069 Spain 0.107
Germany 0.025 Turkey 0.152




Note: a) Data for Brazil are for the 1965—1967 period.
b) These data cover all inventory investments in all sectors and are therefore
not comparable with data from firms' balance sheets.
Source:SPO data for Turkey; Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, United Na-
tions, 1969, country tables for other countries.
part of inventory accumulation, too) there can be little doubt that the import
regime was a contributing factor in Turkey's high figure. Unfortunately,
Turkish estimates of inventory investment do not go back before 1963. It is
therefore not possible to contrast the figures during Phase JIwith the figures
from earlier years.6 Nonetheless, the very high Turkish figure combined with
interview impressions and sample data suggests that inventories were probably
substantially higher as a result of the trade regime than they would otherwise
have been.
Underutilized capacity
Import-substitutIon policies are usually paradoxical: undertaken to reduce
dependence upon imports for final consumption, they can increase depend.
ence upon imports of raw materials and intermediate goods. When import-
substitution industries are established they require imports to sustain the flow
of production. In the event of "foreign-exchange shortage" not only does
final consumption decline, as it would have done in the absence of import-
substitution policies, but employment and domestic production can decrease
due to the absence of intermediate goods and raw materials required more or
less in fixed proportions to the production process. Planners can find them-
selves on the horns of a dilemma. If intermediate goods necessary for current
6. The average ratio of inventory to fixed capital investment was 0.136 for the period
1963 to 1965.230 MicroeconomicEffects of the Trade Regime Resource Allocational and
production are permitted, then capital goods imports to expand capacity are
reduced, and the growth process is inhibited. One possible outcome is the
underutilization of existing capacity, due to unavailability of imported inter-
mediate goods.
There is no doubt that the Turkish planners were caught in this particular
dilemma: as seen in Chapter VI, raw materials imports were systematically
underforecast and had to be successively increased. To the extent the flow of
raw materials was permitted, the cost was the failure of capital goods imports
to rise as rapidly as they would have otherwise. Insofar as raw material
imports were restricted to permit additional capital goods imports, excess
capacity in existing firms could develop.7
Inaddition to the possibility of excess capacity arising because of smaller-
than.desired flows of imports, another factor was important in Turkey and
makes estimation of the degree of excess capacity very difficult. It was seen
in Chapter VI that import licenses were allocated among industrialists upon
the basis of their capacity. Thus incentives were created by the import-licens-
ing system to build additional capacity even if existing capacity was under-
utilized.8 Failure to expand when other firms were obtaining capital goods
import licenses and expanding could result in a reduced share of the market
even if existing capacity was underutilized.
Thus, not only could underutilization of capacity arise because of inade-
quate raw material imports, it could also result from firms' deliberate over-
expansion. Either way, the costs of the excess capacity are clearly attributa-
ble to the trade regime.
Difficulty arises because the license-allocation procedure led not only to
idle capacity but also to overstating actual capacity. Table VIII-3 gives data
reported to the Union of Chambers on capacity utilization for 1966, 1967
and 1969, the only years for which data are available. For each quota number
against which license applications were made, the Union reported actual levels
of output and capacity. The first column gives the number of quota alloca-
tions under which reported capacity utilization was less than 10 per cent. In
1968 18 quotas, or 12 per cent of the quota numbers for which estimates are
available, were destined for industries reported working at less than 10 per
cent of capacity, and 65 per cent were destined to firms reported operating at
less than 50 per cent of capacity. The figures are comparable for 1965 and
7. It should be noted that excess capacity, in the sense used above, implies that pro-
ducers would expand output at existing input-output prices if they were free to
purchase their desired amounts of all inputs at those prices. Other forms of physical
excess capacity that would occur as the result of unprotitability of additional pro-
duction at prevailing prices are not included in the analysis.
8. Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India Planning for Industrialization, Oxford
University Press (London), 1970, pp. 326—7, analyze the same phenomenon for India.
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Table VHI-3
Data reported to Union of Chambers on capacity utilization, 1966, 1967, 1969

























Notes:a) No definition of capacity is given by the Union of Chambers. They give two
entries: (1) total capacity, and (2) capacity utilized in the year indicated. The
ratio of the two was computed for the entries in this table.
b) The number of quotas is less than in Table Vl-7 because some quotas had
multiple uses and no physical measure of capacity was given.
Source:Same as Table Vl-7.
9. Capacity measures are given by the Union of Chambers in physical units, so no
meaningful weighting of sectors was possible.
10. A story, told by a friend, may illustrate. A man imported sonic machineiy in the
early 1960's. His machinery was inspected and his capacity certified. He then sold
the machinery for more than he paid for it. He continues to get import licenses: his
profits on resale in each period prior to August 1970 exceeded the initial cost of the
machinery.
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the same phenomenonfor India.
1967, with a slightly higher fraction working at less than half of capacity.9
If these data were accepted at face value, they would indicate serious
underutilization of capacity. While some industries might have been operating
below capacity due to strikes or inadequate demand, that explanation cannot
cover half the recipients of quota allocations. However, as indicated above,
incentives were present to overstate capacity.' 0 Once an entrepreneur'sca-
pacity was certified, he could sell his equipment and remain eligible for
import licenses. Thus in some cases the same physical capacity could be
counted two or three times. Moreover, incentives were present to overstate
the physical capacity of actually operating equipment.
Itis thus difficult to place much credence in the evidence basedupon
import-license data. Other available evidence suggests that therewas excess
capacity in some sectors, but that it was not nearly as widespreadas the
Union of Chambers' data indicates.
In the summer of 1966, at a time when import shortageswere believed to
be resulting in excess capacity, an AID team undertookan extensive study of
the problem. Their conclusions were as follows:
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The interviews indicated that despite the problems of the import system —andthey
were and are many —mostproducers were able to obtain the essential imported
supplies needed to operate their factories. Not all firms were operated at or near
capacity, but those that were not generally limited to industries which used very large
amounts of imported materials relative to their output. This was particularly the case
with the assembly industries...Other branches of industry which were adversely af-
fected were wool textiles (which use imported merino wool), canning, and plastics,
all of which depend heavily on imported materials..
On the basis of more recent discussions, there is little reason to believe that the
situation has changed radically...Although the total level of imports has decreased
since 1966, the level of raw materials necessary to maintain total production has not,
except for steel products which are now being supplied from Steel Mill..) 1
In interviews with businessmen conducted during 1965, 1967, and 1969
this author found only two cases of plant shutdowns and several instances
where finished goods —lessone or two parts —hadto be stockpiled pending
receipt of imports. Relatively few interviewees commented upon underutiliza-
tion of capacity as being a problem, although many complained of having to
purchase from small firms at high prices. Similarly, time series production
data do not provide any evidence of widespread, persistent, excess capacity.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the import regime led to some over-
building of capacity and idle capacity in some heavily import-dependent sec-
tors. By and large, however, businessmen avoided the costs of plant shutdown
and underutilization by incurring heavy inventory costs.
III. Employment, factor proportions, and income distribution
As seen in Chapter VI, the EER for capital goods fell in the latter half of
the 1960's. The decline in the rate was the result of increasing use of "invest-
ment incentives," which essentially consisted of the partial or total exemp-
tion from or postponement of duties and surcharges otherwise payable on
imports. Thus by 1969, with an official exchange rate of TL 9 =$1,a capital
good import subject to 50 per cent duty would have cost the importer in
excess of TL 18, combining stamp tax, surcharges and production tax, but
would have cost him as little as TL 10 if granted total exemption from duties.
Thus for those receiving SPO approval of their investment projects, the im-
plicit subsidy on capital goods imports was sizeable.
In theory, subsidization of capital goods imports can have several effects:
(1) capital-intensive industries will become relatively more attractive invest-
ment alternatives than labor-intensive industries; (2) entrepreneurs who can
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obtainthe subsidy will substitute capital for labor; and (3) there will be a
substitution of imported capital goods for domestic capital goods. As a conse-
quence, in a competitive market one would expect the equilibrium wage to be
lower and less growth in domestic capital goods industries than would other-
wise have occurred. When wages are determined by non-market forces, one
would expect that employment opportunities would grow less rapidly than
they would in the absence of subsidization of capital goods imports.
The labor market was not free in Turkey. Minimum wages were in effect
throughout the 1960's, and the real wage increased at an average annual rate
of 2.9 per cent between 1963 and 1969.
2Thusincreases in the real wage
would have led to some incentives to substitute capital for labor even if the
real price of capital goods had remained constant. As it was, the real price of
capital goods imports fell on average about 4.5 per cent per annum. Thus
employment and factor proportions were the combined result of the trade
regime and of domestic policies with respect to labor. Insofar as the effects
predicted by theory are concerned, a rough approximation would be that
about two-thirds of any shift probably resulted from the trade regime, and
about one-third from domestic labor policies.
In this section the microeconomic aspects of employment and factor pro-
portions and their effects upon income distribution are examined. In Chap-
ter IX estimates of the overall employment effects are presented.
Employment and factor proportions
Several pieces of background information will be useful to the reader.
Throughout the 1960's Turkey had an excess supply of unskilled labor. It is
estimated that 9.5 per cent of the urban labor force and 9.9 per cent of the
rural labor force were unemployed in 1967.13 The impact of unemployment
is cushioned, to some degree, in two ways: (1) a large number of Turkish
workers are employed in Western Europe, and particularly in Germany;'
12. Data are from Duncan R. Miller, "Labor Force and Employment: An Overview," in
Duncan R. Miller (ed.), Labor Force and Employment in Turkey, USAID, mimeo-
graph (Ankara), 1970, p. 33.
13. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), pp. 148—9.
14. As of 1970, over a half million Turkish workers were employed in West Germany.
In 1965, 9.7 million persons were employed in agriculture out of an economically
active population of 13.5 million, leaving a non-agricultural labor force of 3.8 mil-
lion. Even allowing for labor force growth after 1965, the half million Turks working
abroad represent well over 10 per cent of the Turkish non-agricultural labor force.
Although Turkey could be placed in an exceedingly difficult situation in the event of
a severe recession in Western Europe, the governments have been cooperating to
smooth the flow of workers and to avoid the disruptions that could result with sharp
changes in European employment opportunities. For an excellent analysis of some
aspects of the Turkish workers in Germany, and differential productivity and learn-
ing behavior of Turkish workers in the two countries, see Terry D. Monson, Migra-
tion, Experience-Generated Learning and Infant Industries. A Case Study of Turkey,
Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, March 1972.
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and (2) family ties are usually sufficiently strong so that the unemployed are
supported by their families and thus are not as adversely affected as would
otherwise be the case.
In addition to an excess supply of unskilled labor, the number of college
graduates in Turkey expanded very rapidly during the 1960's. With relatively
few exceptions there was an abundant supply of highly trained manpower. By
contrast, however, persons with middle-level technical skills were generally in
short supply.' 6Insuch specialities as glass-blowing, die-casting, repair and
maintenance jobs and middle-level technical personnel of virtually every varie-
ty, the absence of persons with appropriate skills constituted a major prob-
lem.''
Changes in relative factor prices.Table VIII-4 presents data on the
prices of domestic and imported capital goods and on the industrial wage.
Ideally, of course, one would like data on the cost of capital services rather
than on the cost of capital goods. However, insofar as any data are available
they do not suggest any significant changes in the nominal interest rate nor in
the return to capital in the period under review; moreover, any changes which
did occur were undoubtedly small contrasted with changes in the real price of
capital goods.
The first column of Table VIII-4 gives the average daily wage in manufac-
turing, which more than doubled between 1960 and 1969. The second col-
umn gives the TL cost for a dollar's worth of imported capital goods as
calculated in Appendix A. Of course, to the extent that the international
price of capital goods rose, the EER provides an underestimate of the increase
in the domestic price of imported capital goods. However, changes in inter-
national prices since 1960 have probably been small relative to changes in the
PLD.EER. Column 3 gives the implicit GNP deflator for the manufacturing
sector, taken as a proxy for the price of domestically produced capital goods.
Column 4 gives the average price of capital goods and column 5 the wage
relative to the weighted price of capital goods. The wage rose relative to the
price of both types of capital equipment, especially in the latter half of the
15. In the summer of 1971 the author was on the campus of the Middle East Technical
University and witnessed 4,000 men applying for eight janitorial and ground
nance positions. All were healthy, well-fed, and reasonably dressed. Workers applying
at the Labor Exchange for permission to go to Western Europe are of similar appear-
ance. The large numbers of applicants attest to the severity of the unemployment
problem, while the fact of the family system indicates how that problem can exist
without greater unrest.
16. For an analysis of this phenomenon and the reasons for it, see Anne 0. Krueger,
"Rates of Return to Turkish Higher Education," Journal of Human Resources, Fall
1972.
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1955 6.87 4.10 38 32 2.15
1960 14.11 12.11 92 82 1.72
1961 14.88 12.55 100 85 1.75
1962 15.73 12.54 103 86 1.83
1963 17.21 12.99 108 91 1.89
1964 19.07 12.99 110 96 1.98
1965 20.66 15.50 114 100 2.07
1966 22.66 15.50 121 106 2.14
1967 24.75 15.29 124 114 2.17
1968 27.47 12.26 124 118 2.33
1969 33.98 13.16 132 124 2.74
1970 37.40 139 133 2.81
Sources:1) Wage rate: average daily wage rate of workers in manufacturing covered by
social insurance, Social Insurance Institute, Statistics Annual, 1955—1969.
2) Imported capital goods EERs from Appendix A.
3) Domestic capital goods: Implicit deflator for the manufacturing sector was
taken and linked in 1961 and 1965.
4) Capital goods price: for 1962—1970, implicit deflators from Tilt Programi,
1971 were used. Before that, imported and domestic prices were weighted by
their share in machinery and equipment investment.
1960's, and the price of imported capital goods fell sharply relative to the
price of domestic capital goods after 1965. We consider first the evidence on
use of imported and domestic capital equipment, and thereafter examine the
evidence on substitution of capital for labor.
Imported versus domestic capital equipment. There are two ways in which
one would expect the ratio of imported to domestic capital goods to be
affected by the trade regime: (1) the price of imported capital goods relative
to the price of domestic capital goods would induce greater use of the cheap.
er kind, and (2) the availability of foreign exchange for capital goods imports,
in the presence of excess demand under quantitative restrictions, would deter-
mine the volume of imported capital goods. 18 Thefirst effect is relatively
straightforward and would occur in all sectors of the economy, although
investment in some sectors would become relatively more attractive than in
18. It should be recognized in what follows that underinvoicing and other phenomena
associated with the trade regime might lead to serious problems with the data.236 Microeconomic Effects of the Trade Regime
others depending upon the ratio of imported to domestic capital equipment
employed in each sector. The second effect is more complex. Within each
sector, firms may purchase more domestic capital equipment when they are
unable to obtain import licenses. In addition, investment may shift to sectors
relativelyless dependent upon imported capital equipment as domestic
savings are available for the purpose.
McCabe and Michalopoulos investigated the combined effects of foreign
exchange availability and relative prices of imported and domestic capital
investment for the years 1950 to 1963.19 As a proxy for the availability of
foreign exchange, they used the amount of foreign credit received by Turkey
in each year. The use of that proxy seems reasonable since foreign credit,
especially in the 1950-to-1963 period, consisted largely of suppliers' credits
and project aid, both of which are generally used to purchase imported capital
goods.
Their regression equation, and results, were:
=2.40—0.03 + 0.26 l.60D
(0.04) (2.57) (—6.51)
R2=0.89F=28
where 'm/'d is the ratio of investment in imported to domestic capital equip-
ment (given the unavailability of capital stock figures), is the ratio of
the price of the two kinds of equipment, Re/Rd is the ratio of external credit
to internal credit (the volume of bank loans) and D was a dummy for the
post-devaluation years (1959 to 1963).
The McCabe•Michalopoulos results suggest that a 1 per cent increase in
foreign credits resulted in a 0.26 per cent increase in the ratio of imported to
domestic capital equipment invested. The results are what one would have
expected, especially for the period covered by their study, with foreign ex-
change availability being an important determinant of capital goods imports.
The fact that the relative-price variable is not significant may be the result
of the inclusion of the dummy variable for the years after 1958. Since the
1958 devaluation constituted the major change in the relative price of im-
ported capital goods, that variable probably picks up most effects of the
relative price changes.
In addition to the McCabe-Michalopoulos results, additional evidence on
the effects of the import regime on investment composition can be gained by
inspection of the behavior of construction investment relative to total invest-
ment over the period. As seen in Chapter II, plant and equipment investment
19. James McCabe and Constantine Michalopoulos, "Investment Composition and Em-
ployment in Turkey,"Discussion Paper No. 22, AID, October 1971.
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Composition of investment, 1959 to 1969
Construc-Machinery andTotal ConstructionMachinery and
tion Equipment Equipment
(millions (millions (millions(% of total (% of total
of IL) of TL) of TL)investment) investment)
1959 4,397 2,294 6,691657 34.3
1960 4,817 2,699 7,51664.1 35.9
1961 4,917 2,926 7,84362.6 37.3
1962 5,292 3,420 8,71260.7 39.3
1963 6,569 3,508 10,07765.2 34.8
1964 7,381 3,186 10,56769.8 30.2
1965 8,466 3,301 11,76771.9 28.1
1966 10,399 4,754 15,15368.6 31.4
1967 11,931 5,331 17,26269.1 30.9
1968 14,015 6,416 20,43168.5 31.4
1969 16,656 6,718 23,37471.2 28.7
Note:SIS data are not consistent with Gürtan's data given in Table 11-10 and LV-9
for years for which the series overlap. The source of the discrepancy is un-
known.
Source:National Income 1970, op. cit. (Table 1-2), Table 6.
in Turkey is much more heavily dependent upon imports than is construction
investment. Data for the period 1953-to-1958 were given in Table 11-10.
Table VIII-5 gives data for subsequent years.
It will be recalled that investment in plant and machinery fell from 30.6
per cent of total investment in 1953 to a low of 23.6 per cent in 1957, rising
to 26.9 per cent in 1958. As can be seen, the absolute and relative increase in
the importance of machinery and equipment investment rose until 1962,
reaching 39.3 per cent of total investment in that year. Thereafter investment
composition once again shifted toward heavier emphasis upon construction
investment. The import stringency of 1964—1965 is clearly reflected in the
data, as the share of construction increased to its levels of the mid-1950's.
With renewed project credits in 1966—1968, investment in machinery and
equipment again increased, but by no means reattained its relative importance
of the early 1960's.
The timing of the changes in importance of construction in total invest-
ment coincides remarkably closely with the delineation of Phases of the trade
regime in Turkey. During Phase II, in both the 1950's and 1960's, invest-
ment became increasingly oriented toward those sectors requiring relatively
few imported capital goods. During Phase IV of the early 1960's investment
shifted toward plant and machinery, despite its price, relatively higher thanResourse Allocational and Growth E4
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in the Phase II episodes. It would appear that the availability of import
licenses has been relatively more important than the relative price of im-
ported capital equipment, although both factors have influenced the composi-
tion of investment.
Capital-labor substitution.The fact that quantitative restrictions on cap-
ital goods imports may have offset part or all of the desired substitution
between types of capital equipment does not rule out the possibility of
substitution of capital for labor on the part of those firms fortunate enough
to receive capital goods import licenses and duty exemptions. As seen above,
two factors were operative here: the price of imported capital goods fell in
real terms, and the real wage rose.
It is difficult to estimate how much substitution of capital for labor in fact
took place because the large change in relative factor prices occurred in the
late 1960's and the latest available Census of Manufactures is for 1963.
Demirgil undertook a variety of tests on data for the public sector for the
periods 1939—1963 and 1949—1963 and found some statistical evidence of
capital-labor substitution,2° although productivity growth dominated the
data.
McCabe and Michalopoulos extended their analysis to investigate the rela-
tionship between the labor share of value-added and the ratio of imported
capital goods investment to total investment. They used the wage share, in
the absence of better data, as a proxy for the labor intensity of each sector.
Their data were cross-section data from the 1963 Census of Manufactures.




where W/V is the labor share in value added, and 'm/' is the share of im-
ported equipment in total equipment investment. In their model, the coeffi-
cient on the term 'rn!' reflects the difference between the labor shares in
processes using domestic and imported capital equipment.22 Substituting the
20. Demir Demirgil, "Factors Affecting the Choice of Technology in Turkey and Impli-
cations for the Level of Employment," in Miller (ed.), op. cit. (Note 12).
21. McCabe and Michalopoulos, op. cit. (Note 19), pp. 6—8.
22. The total capital share is a weighted average of the capital coefficients corresponding
to the two types of capital stock: (1 —W/V)=Km/K(1 —bm)+ (1 —Km/K)(1
bd), where bd and bm are the labor shares in the two processes. By manipulation, the
percentage difference in the capital-labor ratio of two sectors is:Resourse Allocational and Growth Effects of the Regime in the 1960's 239
resultsof the regression estimate, they estimated that the labor share in
value-added was 43 per cent in processes using domestic capital goods and 23
per cent in processes using imported capital equipment. Thus if wages are
equal across sectors, employment would be twice as great per unit of invest-
ment in domestic capital equipment as it would be in foreign.23
Both the McCabe-Michalopoulos data and the Demirgil data are for the
period ending in 1963. With the amount of structural change in Turkey
between the earlier years and the 1960's, their results do not necessarily
reflect the degree of capital-labor substitution during the 1960's. In the ab-
sence of recent Census data, Ongut investigated the extent of capital-labor
substitution on the basis of information from investment projects financed by
the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.24 He found that businessmen
generally regarded the choice of technology as given, although
...itis also quite likely that because investors do not have an incentive in adopting
labor-intensive techniques, they do not explore the availability of Less expensive, less
modern and more labor absorbing equipment.25
There was considerable evidence, however, that substitution was possible in a
variety of ancillary operations. There was a "marked tendency to replace
labor with automatic machinery" for those operations.
OngUt found that in cases where a variety of techniques were available to
choose from, the capital-intensive technique was invariably chosen. In one
case, a firm with an existing plant and 600 employees wished to double their
capacity. Investment was 50 per cent greater than in the earlier, labor-
intensive factory, and employment was 106 workers, contrasted with the
600 in the older factory. The present value of the two alternative expansion
patterns was computed under alternative assumptions. Including all invest-
ment incentives and evaluating both investments at existing prices, the pres-
ent value of the capital-intensive factory was TL 7.1 million, and that of the
labor-intensive factory TL 6.14 million. Excluding investment incentives and
adjusting capital goods imports to a shadow rate of foreign exchange of IL
15 =$1,both projects had negative present values although the labor-
intensive project was the more attractive of the two. With wages constant
(contrasted with a projected 10 per cent annual rate of increase upon which
the firm had based its expansion plans), no investment incentives, and the
shadow exchange rate, the present value of the labor-intensive project was TL
23. McCabe and Michalopoulos also found that output per man was lower with use of
domestic capital equipment, but that total value-added per unit of investment would
be higher.
24. Ibrahim dngut, "Economic Policies, Investment Decisions, and Employment in
Turkish Industry," in Miller (e&), op. cit. (Note 12).
25. Ibid., p. 93.
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5.6 million while that of the capital intensive project was negative at minus
TL 0.5 million. öngtit noted that the choice of the labor-intensive project
would have created more than 500 additional jobs, since the foreign exchange
saved on the project by choice of the labor-intensive technique would have
been used to import other capital goods, with additional employment oppor-
tunities thereby created.26
In Chapter IX estimates of the employment effects of import-substition
for the manufacturing sector as a whole will be given, based upon existing
capital-labor ratios in each sector. It should be borne in mind that the substi-
tution of capital for labor which might occur within each sector is not included
in the estimates and that therefore the macroestimates probably underesti-
mate the total employment effects of the trade regime and import-substitu-
tion policies.
Income distribution
There can be little doubt that the Turkish trade regime resulted in non-
optimal resource allocation with consequent losses in the attainable bundle of
goods and services available for society's utilization. One defense sometimes
given for nonoptimality in the economic efficiency sense is that income distri-
bution may be altered in socially desired ways which cannot be attained by
first-best measures.
in Turkey, as in many developing countries, one of the development goals
has been a "fair distribution of income?'2 'inthis section consideration is
given to the income-districutional effects of the Turkish trade regime. It will
be seen that by and large the trade regime altered income distribution only
within groups, and that the alteration which did occur was generally question-
able on social grounds. Thus Turkish trade policies were non-optimal on both
efficiency and equity grounds.
Evidence on Turkey's income distribution is so fragile that any inferences
drawn with respect to changes over time would be perilous. Nonetheless,
there are strong a priori grounds for believing that the effects of Turkey's
trade regime on overall income distribution have probably been slight. More-
over, such effects as did result were probably in the nature more of redistribu-
tion within the middle and upper income groups than of a transfer between
groups.
Export versus import-competing interests.In an exchange-control re-
gime with currency overvaluation, theory predicts that potential exporters
26. Ongüt, op. cit. (Note 24), Table 1.
27. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 43.
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will be adversely affected relative to those whose interests lie in import-
competing production. In Turkey, however, the major exporting interests are
in agriculture and mining. The effect for agriculture of any redistribution
away from exporting interests that might have resulted from currency over-
valuation was largely offset by the government's price policies toward agricul-
ture. As seen in Chapter VII, price intervention by the various state agencies
and cooperatives resulted in severing the relations between the real exchange
rate and the price received by farmers for wheat, tobacco, figs, raisins and
hazelnuts. For those commodities, which constitute the bulk of agricultural
exports, the chief determinant of prices was the nature of the price support
program and not the real exchange rate.
For agriculture as a whole the evidence suggests that its term of trade
improved gradually from 1950 to 1953, and remained fairly constant until
about 1968, the latest year for which data are available.28 Thus neither on a
priori grounds nor on the basis of agriculture's terms of trade is there any
evidence to suggest that agriculture suffered relative to industry. Within agri-
culture, it is probably the case that the farmers of the coastal plains, produc-
ing the citrus fruit, cotton, olive oil, vegetables, etc., suffered relative to what
their position would have been under a unified exchange rate. However, there
was some offset in that (1) those commodities were subject to more favorable
exchange rates in the 1950's than were the traditional commodities, and (2)
in the late 1960's the export rebates partially compensated for the overvalued
exchange rate. Even taking these factors into account, however, agricultural
income and output in the coastal region was less than it would have been
under different exchange rate policies: agricultural exports from the coastal
areas were highly responsive to price changes (as seen in Chapter VII), and the
DRC of output expansion in that region would have been relatively low.
Since the fertile coastal region has a per capita agricultural income well above
the Turkish average, agricultural incomes may have been slightly more evenly
distributed as a result of discrimination against exports, but the effect was
very small and more than offset by government subsidies on grains.
The second export sector in which adverse income distributional conse-
quences might have been expected was the mining sector. There can be little
doubt that mining activity was stagnant and even declining in response to the
erosion of the real exchange rate. However, in terms of the personal income
distribution it is not clear that there would have been any effect: most mining
enterprises are state-owned. During the 1950's Central Bank credits covered
most of the SEE deficits, with the result that the incidence of the losses was
spread over the entire community. Although a more rapid expansion of
28. Nur Keyder, "Türkiye'de Tarimsal Reel Getir ye Kdylünün Refah Seviyesi," METU
Studies in Development,. Fall 1970, p. 38.
re project was negative at minus
of the labor-intensive project
jobs, since the foreign exchange
'intensive technique would have
additional employment oppor-
effects of irnport-substjt ion
1 be given, based upon existing
e borne in mind that the substi-
,'ithin each sector is not included
oestimates probably underesti-
de regime and import-substitu.
trade regime resulted in non-
;ses in the attainable bundle of
ation. One defense sometimes
sense is that income distri-
which cannot be attained by
one of the development goals
ithissection consideration is
Turkish trade regime. It will
income distribution only
occur was generally question-
iles were non-optimal on both
so fragile that any inferences
be perilous. Nonetheless,
that the effects of Turkey's
probably been slight. More-
he nature more of redistribu-
s than of a transfer between
In an re-
cts that potential exporters
b
I:242 MicroeconomicEffects of the Trade Regime
mining activities might have led to greater employment in that sector, the
effect thereof could not have been significantly different from that of growth
of other sectors.
Thus the groups that theory suggests would lose through currency over-
valuation were fairly well protected through the government's absorption of
the losses that would otherwise have resulted. In the absence of these domes-
tic policies, the efficiency losses resulting from currency overvaluation and
suboptimal levels of production for export would have been accompanied by
redistribution from agriculture and mining. Since the same income distribu-
tion could have been achieved by higher export EERs, a unified exchange rate
would have achieved superior resource allocation without adverse effects on
income distribution.
The groups that theory predicts would gain from currency overvaluation
and exchange control are the import-competing producers and the recipients
of import licenses. Many of the apparent gains were unreal here, as business-
men entered into import-competing production activities who would have
entered into production of manufactured goods for export under alternative
exchange-rate policies. Moreover, under a unified exchange rate, there would
have been considerably greater imports of finished goods than in fact oc-
curred. Importers who received windfall gains on their import licenses would
otherwise have had a greater volume of business.
As seen in Chapter VI, there was a significant and important conflict be-
tween importers and industrialists. The conflict was natural and real, although
it centered over which group was to receive the gains. New import-substitu-
tion firms received import licenses as soon as they emerged, and therefore
obtained the premia associated with those import licenses. Such a develop-
ment came at the expense of the importers who had previously dealt with the
commodity. Thus importers of television sets, for instance, were forced to
find another line of business or to close down when domestic production of
television sets started. Because importing was such a profitable undertaking,
the losses experienced by the importers were large. Some responded by start-
ing their own import-substituting enterprises. Others contracted their opera-
tions, and changed the type of goods imported as new domestic production
capabilities arose.
The importers were sometimes able to slow down the rate at which goods
disappeared from eligible import lists, but they were unable to stop it. The
economic and political power of the importers declined gradually throughout
the twenty-year period and conversely, that of the industrialists gradually
rose. By 1970 it was evident that the power of the importers was largely
spent and that the industrialists as a group had gained the ascendancy.
Functional shares.It is likely that the incidence of the trade regime on
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functional income distribution was small and was felt primarily through
changes in distribution within groups rather than between them. The im-
porter-industrialist conflict was one such case and has already been discussed.
During the 1950's the share of those on fixed salaries declined. Indeed, the
FFYP declared that one of the major detrimental effects of the 1950's was
that of altering the income distribution in an "unjust" direction.29 That
effect, however, was the result of inflation rather than of the trade regime.3°
Probably the largest effect of the trade regime was on the distribution of
labor income. As will be seen in Chapter IX, the import-substitution indus-
tries generally paid higher wages, required skilled workers, and offered fewer
employment opportunities than did the traditional and export-oriented indus-
tries. Minimum wage legislation also contributed, since the impbrt.substitu-
tion firms, being large and visible, could evade it less easily than the smaller,
relatively labor-intensive traditional firms.
The consequent increase in demand for skilled workers undoubtedly raised
the wages of those men relative to those of the unskilled. The fact that
demand for unskilled labor rose more slowly than under an alternative trade
regime probably meant fewer employment opportunities, rather than lower
wages, in the presence of minimum wage legislation.
The incidence of fewer employment opportunities for unskilled workers
was on the urban unemployed and those in rural areas who would have
migrated if employment had been available. Insofar as there would have been
more migration, per capita incomes in the agricultural sector might have been
higher had urban employment increased more rapidly.3Regardless of
whether it was the urban unemployed or potential migrants who were ad-
versely affected, the income-distributional effect was to increase the labor
income accruing to one group and reduce the labor income going to another.
Without quantitative evidence to estimate the magnitude of the increase in
skilled workers' incomes and the elasticity of demand for unskilled workers,
it is not possible to estimate whether labor income increased or decreased.
With the two changes in offsetting directions, however, it is likely that any
change in aggregate labor income was relatively small.
29. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 22.
30. Even in 1971, many Turks cited the fact that some people made large fortunes from
the trade regime in the 1950's as one of the greatest evils of that period. It is likely
that the gains accrued to those already in the upper income group at the expense of
others in that group who were adversely affected by economic policy. Redistribution
was primarily among sources of profit, rather than between functional groups.
31. The disparity between urban and rural living standards appears to have narrowed.
The ratios of urban to rural per capita income were: 1950, 6.0; 1955, 5.7; 1960,4.8;
and 1965, 5.1. Merih Celasun, "Prospective Growth of Non-agricultural Employ-
ment in Turkey," inMffler(ed), op. cit. (Note 12),p. 159.
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Public sector versus private sector.Both the administration of the trade
regime and import.substitution policies somewhat favored the public sector at
the expense of rlrivate sector. Most important was the degree to which
public and private firms had differential access to scarce foreign exchange.
Public sector firms were probably at an advantage in obtaining import licenses
because of their relatively greater representation on committees responsible
for allocating foreign exchange. In the 1950's, SEEs were often exempt from
paying surcharges and duties on their imports; even when they were not, the
duties and surcharges frequently were left unpaid, as the SEEs were unable to
meet their financial obligations. As was seen in Part Two, the SEEs were not
required to pay the new de facto exchange rate for almost a year after August
1958 and continued to obtain their imports at TL 2.80 per dollar while the
private sector was paying TL 9 per dollar.
In the 1960's SEEs were not subject to guarantee deposit requirements,
whereas private sector firms were. Also, the fact that much of the heavy
import-substitution investment was undertaken by the public sector led to a
direct increase in the relative importance of SEEs.
But none of these effects need necessarily have resulted from the trade
regime or from import-substitution policies. SEEs could have been subjected
to the same treatment as private firms with no alteration in the nature of the
regime. It seems more reasonable to interpret the treatment of the SEEs as
the result of deliberate government policy: since the import regime was there
anyway, it was one of the instruments used to attain the government's goals
with regard to the relative importance of the two sectors.
In summary, the subsidization of capital goods imports combined with
rising real wages due to domestic policies created a bias toward use of im-
ported machinery and capital-intensive processes. Except for the relative
wages and employment opportunities of skilled and unskilled workers, there
is little evidence that the income distribution was significantly affected by the
trade regime, as government policies with respect to agriculture offset the
effects that might otherwise have occurred.
ii